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COMPONENT-BASED ENGAGEMENT... An Argument for the Baltics?

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, or the Department of the Navy.

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COMPONENT-BASED ENGAGEMENT... An Argument for the Baltics?

Engagement...

American leadership and engagement in
the world are vital to our security, and the world
is a safer place as a result. ¹

President Clinton
May 1997

As the LCACs bearing U.S. Marines and a composite company (minus) of members of the combined Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), whose personnel consist of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian soldiers, crossed the line of departure and pushed towards the distant shore, a young American field grade officer surveyed his Marines and the BALTBAT soldiers. Pleased with the efforts of his own men as well as those of the trilateral BALTBAT organization, with whom his unit had spent the better part of the last 14 days training together, he was only then beginning to recognize the importance of such endeavors as peacetime engagement and appreciate its impact on the future of each nations' military and that of his individual Marines as well as the BALTBAT soldiers.

As a part of a SPMAGTF embarked aboard a two ship amphibious task force, his Marines had worked side-by-side with soldiers from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Exchanging operational concepts and sharing tactics, techniques and procedures, they nurtured one another's understanding of each country's military doctrine and capabilities. Gaining a keen appreciation

for "what it takes" to successfully integrate cultural differences and military capabilities in order to conduct combined operations, Marines, sailors and soldiers alike advanced their mastery of the profession-of-arms. By putting aside his initial frustration of not being able to singularly focus on his own unit's training requirements and embracing the idea of mutual gains for all involved, this young officer now recognized the importance of, and the gains to be had by participating in mil-to-mil, peacetime engagement activities such as this recurring, CINC-sponsored "Baltic SPMAGTF" that was specifically designed to engage the maritime, ground and air forces of the combined and individual Baltic States.

Ship visits in each of the three countries' major naval port, SAR activities, direct action and close quarters drills, patrol craft, mining and countermining activities, ship-to-shore activities and coastal reconnaissance events were the lion's share of the past two and a half week's of naval activities. These activities were coupled with the day-to-day exchange between ships' officers and crews that informally exposed each country's naval personnel to damage control techniques, SATCOM procedures, readiness reporting and maintenance procedures and numerous other shipboard activities. The ground component exercised its artillery battery and mortars in concert with host country indirect fire systems, conducted patrolling and platoon-sized operations, exercised company-sized, helo assault capabilities and provided the groundwork for the development of a much needed small arms, known distance, marksmanship training range.

The SPMAGTF with its Navy accompaniment, both of which was specifically designed and tasked to conduct Baltic region, mil-to-mil, peacetime engagement gained invaluable

experience by operating in unfamiliar seas and training areas and although short-lived (21 days total), advanced the cooperative efforts of each country's military by furthering understanding, confidence, friendship and most importantly, trust.

The above scenario, while set to the near future, has as its basis USEUCOM's peacetime engagement activities as executed today. Even as we set out to examine and discuss the importance of a well-orchestrated engagement strategy, the European Command, like its other regional CINC counterparts, continues its effort to advance U. S. security throughout its Area of Responsibility (AOR) and is well-entrenched with the execution of the unending task of engaging various militaries and defense establishments present in its AOR. "Absent European stability, there cannot be a secure or prosperous America-- (It) is all interconnected²".

Introduction. Devoid coherent peacetime engagement doctrines, CINCs strive to affect successful peacetime engagement strategies within their perspective AORs. Too often the execution of theater engagement plans fail to achieve the synergetic gains made possible by multi-agency, joint-military and combined contributions. Beyond the problematic descriptors of our peacetime engagement strategies much of our success to date can be attributed to broad-based activities. If these gains, or initial footprints accomplished by our well-directed yet shotgun approach in providing exposure to foundation activities are to be built upon and if our peacetime engagement activities are to remain relevant (in terms of U.S. and target country/region mutual benefit) they must grow from a general purpose program to one that is tailored and focused on applying limited resources towards the maturing and ever-changing military environments found in each of the Baltic States and the region as a whole. Individual

country work plans and regional programs have all been successful in their execution, but don't necessarily link engagement activities to one another.

Peacetime engagement activities are both capital and manpower intensive, particularly those occurring in the USEUCOM AOR--with the failure of the Former Soviet Union and the emergence of Eastern European and Newly Independent States coupled with in-theater, real-world crises peacetime engagement activities have outpaced CINC resources. With continued U.S. military downsizing and its global impact on force laydown, CINC USEUCOM increasingly relies on out-of-theater sourcing of the force capability necessary to execute his peacetime engagement. By seeking to better align assets to the desired result we can achieve the goals and objectives of the National Security and Military Strategies.

The Baltic States with their emerging and unencumbered Western orientation coupled with the region's geo-strategic significance offers CINC USEUCOM with a unique opportunity to plan and execute focused peacetime engagement that will maximize both effective shaping of the region and effective response to instabilities and crises. Given a range of alternate futures for the Baltic region, what are the optimal Peacetime Engagement strategies for this region? How should the CINC make use of his component organizations to employ forces in order to maximize both an effective shaping of the region and effective response to instabilities and crises? Perhaps accomplishing engagement activities using a component approach is called for. The Baltic States' environs, force structures and military capability endstates collectively lend themselves towards a naval solution--both a maritime and Marine response.

Background. With the disintegration of communist dictatorship throughout Central and Eastern Europe the Cold War as we defined it came to a cataclysmic end. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and the emergence of successor governments in Central and Eastern Europe provided Western powers, chiefly the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies with a unique opportunity to assist in the shaping of these new governments to ensure the spread of democracy. Institutionalizing democracy within fledgling states would prove to be no easy task and while not a new experience for our military the fact that this endeavor would occur within countries that were all recent enemies, either former members of the Warsaw Pact, or former constituent republics of the Soviet Union, provided a major challenge.

The function of a military within a democratic government was a critical issue. These countries had, for nearly fifty years, been communist dictatorships with senior members of the Communist Party seated in the highest ranks of both the government and the military. While civilian governments appeared to control their militaries it was the Communist Party that was in control and as such most, if not all, military planning and decision making was accomplished by the Soviet Union. Thus, the senior leadership of these militaries merited special attention. Would the militaries spoil true democratic reform and growth? This concern necessitated an approach to military engagement that went beyond the narrow scope of the operational and tactical military arena and other military specialties. To ensure that these military establishments emerged as respected institutions within their countries and avoided disruptive behaviors directed towards their civilian government, military engagement activities had to be crafted to ensure the

incorporation of a broad range of subjects not the least of which was a critical focus on the military's role within a democracy.

Role of USEUCOM. The President's National Security Strategy describes the utilization of multiple forms of U.S. national power in terms of the strategic elements of shape, respond and prepare³. The Chairman's, Joint Chiefs of Staff National Military Strategy uses those same strategic elements to describe military activities at the national level⁴. It is the CINC, USEUCOM, as the theater or regional military authority, who is responsible for the planning, development and execution of these strategic elements within the Baltic States. As we examine military engagement activities we are concerned with the "shaping" element of our National Security Strategy. USEUCOM's shaping, or peacetime engagement activities include strengthening Partnership for Peace (PfP); pursuing opportunities for bilateral military-to-military events that further the aims of PfP; and continuing arms control. By incorporating the CINC's vision "A community of free, stable and prosperous nations acting together while respecting the dignity and rights of the individual and adhering to the principles of national sovereignty and international law⁵" these activities implement the strategic concepts discussed previously and seek to provide within the Baltic States: stability; democratization; military professionalism; and closer relationships with NATO.

USEUCOM's Peacetime Engagement. The four principle vehicles driving USEUCOM's peacetime engagement activities include:

- Security Assistance

- George C. Marshall Center
- Partnership for Peace Exercises
- Joint Contact Team Program

Melding the functions and activities of each of these "engagement vehicles" is no easy task, but by failing to do so we risk failure in obtaining our Shaping aims within this particular region at the extreme, or succeeding in a limited fashion at the minimum. Successful validation of these extremely expensive peacetime engagement activities can only occur if a synergy is achieved through complementary utilization of each activity. If for no other reason, the expenditure of defense dollars in support of these costly undertakings demands a fully integrated, component-based engagement approach.

Table (1) illustrates the general characteristics of each of USEUCOM's peacetime engagement activities and provides the reader with an appreciation of the complexity associated with linking individual engagement activities to one another. Regardless of this complexity, U.S. peacetime engagement activities must work together in order to implement the CINC's strategic vision and achieve his theater objectives.

Activity	Security Assistance	Marshall Center	PfP	JCTP
Character	Formal; Traditional	Formal; Non- Traditional	Formal; Traditional	Informal; Non- Traditional
Examples	Schools; Equipment	Classes; Conferences	Exercises	Expose; Familiarize
Responsibility				
National	U.S.	U.S./FRG	NATO	U.S.
USEUCOM	J-4	J-5	J-3	J-5
In-Country	SAO/ODC	SAO/ODC	DATT/DAO	MLT

Table (1): USEUCOM Peacetime Engagement Activities⁶

Security Assistance. " The Security Assistance Office (SAO) provides defense articles and services in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Two key programs are International Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which is currently funded under the Warsaw Initiative. Other SAO programs include but are not limited to Humanitarian Assistance, procurement of Excess Defense Articles (EDA), attendance at U.S. service academies and participation in and sponsorship of George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies courses and conferences⁷." The SAO, which is resident at each of the three Baltic State U.S. Embassies, is managed by the State Department and is executed by the Defense Security Assistance Agency with USEUCOM's assistance. As shown by Table (1), functional

oversight of SAO activities falls under the responsibility of USEUCOM J-4. Maintaining interoperability as a prime regional focus, specific areas of SAO engagement include communications equipment; spare parts; English language training; and airspace control measures.

George C. Marshall Center. The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, located at Garmisch, Germany, is an international institution whose creation was seeded by the 1991 coup attempt in Russia. DOD Directive 5200.34 established the Center and placed its authority, direction and control under USEUCOM (USEUCOM, J-5, Table (1) refers). In 1994 the Center became a German-American partnership and is currently administered by USEUCOM and the German Ministry of Defense. Its mission of "Create a more stable security environment by advancing democratic defense institutions and relationships, and by promoting active, peaceful engagement and enhancing enduring partnerships between the nations of America, Europe and Eurasia⁸" can be more narrowly focused for the purpose of Baltic regional engagement by articulating the goal of: assisting with the development of military institutions compatible with democratic processes and civilian control.

Marshall Center peacetime engagement activities in support of this regional goal are accomplished through tailored, advanced professional education and training of military and civilian officials and by applied research opportunities. Courses, executive classes, conferences and workshops all comprise the Center's "tool kit" in offering defense and security subject area studies to uniformed personnel and their civilian masters. Sponsorship, i.e., funding of these training and educational opportunities is provided through the regional SAOs. An excess of 525

Baltic State participants have attended Marshall Center activities since their inclusion in 1994.

Topic areas range from national strategic studies, through the Center's College of Defense and Security Studies, to civil/military offerings such as: public affairs, defense resource management and emergency preparedness provided to conference and workshop forums. The Center's offerings target a wide spectrum of participants from the low end of O-3 military officer grade, or civilian equivalent, to the general officer, or very senior civilian posts within a country's defensive, or administrative arena. Thus, a wide range of exposure is made possible. This becomes an important factor when considering the other peacetime engagement activities as they typically entail limited participation either in terms of grade and position, or functionality.

Marshall Center activities not only provide great flexibility in terms of what is taught and which individuals receive that information, but also in terms of bilateral or multilateral tailoring. Single country, regional, or multi-national topics of interest are provided. This has been useful with the three Baltic States in particular. Notwithstanding the fact that as each country matures at differing rates with the possibility of one, or two outpacing the other, or as a greater sense of nationalism develops within each country this approach will soon be challenged, if not already.

Lastly, an activity found within the Center that plays a critical role in future peacetime engagement is its Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Course. While not directly linked to the current international forums discussed beforehand, the Center's FAO programs are advancing national and USEUCOM theater engagement policies by providing advanced language proficiency and national/regional expertise on the newly independent states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) to a corps of U.S. and NATO military officers and DOD and State Department officials. An excess of one thousand FAOs have studied at the Center since its creation. Social and academic

interaction with Baltic State participants at the Center's in-house activities as well as in-country internships advance the FAO's appreciation of his, or her country/regional studies. As these officers and officials assume roles of greater import, either in-country as members of military-to-military agencies; U.S. Embassy personnel; as members of high-level Service/Joint; or DOD/DOS staffs, their knowledge will help to fill the current void that is only now being fully appreciated.

Partnership for Peace Exercises. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are among the 16 NATO and 27 Central and Eastern European countries that are signatories of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document. "The United States European Command is a key supporter of, and participant in, the PfP program. USEUCOM develops interoperability initiatives that help lead to common standards, procedures and doctrine with the new Partners (AKA: FSU states). (USEUCOM provides) substance to Partners' relationships with NATO by helping build military capabilities and creating a degree of real security. PfP is intended to forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Council, Central Europe and the Newly Independent States. Its focus is to expand and intensify political and defense cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened relationships by promoting the democratic principles which underpin NATO. The program is open to all North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) States. At a pace and scope determined by their own governments, individual participants in PfP work in concrete ways towards openness in defense budgeting, civilianizing of defense ministries, joint military exercises and defense planning, and creating the capability to operate with NATO forces in support of UN and OSCE activities. Active participation in PfP is

necessary, but does not guarantee, eventual NATO membership. The idea for creating a peacekeeping partnership with the Central Europe and Newly Independent States was originally conceived by the former SACEUR, General Shalikashvili. The program was launched at the January 1994, NATO summit. Current USEUCOM support to PfP includes military leadership visits; Joint Contact Team Program activities; Bilateral Working Group participation/support; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies courses, workshops and conferences; bilateral PfP funding support; and SAO programs⁹." As shown by Table (1), oversight of USEUCOM PfP activities resides with the J-3 and in-country management of those activities is accomplished through each of the three Defense Attaché offices (DATT/DAO) within the respective U.S. Embassy.

Primary USEUCOM PfP activities within the Baltic States include: NATO PfP exercises; "In the Spirit of (ISO)" PfP exercises (those exercises devoid of NATO approval and funding); and Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). PfP and ISO PfP exercises, and JCETs provide the militaries of each country with hands-on training and opportunities to test what they have learned in seminars and conferences. Exercises also add to the militaries, ability to conduct real-world operations. And, while not a prime consideration, the exercises provide these "NATO hopefuls" with an opportunity to display how far they have come. The scope of engagement activities in the PfP/ISO PfP exercise arena is limited to non-lethal activities such as peacekeeping; peace enforcement; search and rescue and humanitarian aid. U.S. sourced funding for Baltic State participation in these activities has grown considerably: \$1350K in FY96; \$1594K in FY97; and \$2472K in FY98 (41% of funding was allocated to Lithuania alone)¹⁰.

Joint Contact Team Program. "The Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) is the foundation of USEUCOM's peacetime engagement (activities). As USEUCOM's only Traditional CINC Activity (TCA), the JCTP brings American ideals and democratic values to (16) countries of the former East Bloc and Newly Independent States. Multi-service, Military Liaison Teams (MLTs) of three to five members demonstrate to host nations how a military functions in a democracy under civilian control. Over 4,000 military-to-military contacts or events coordinated by these teams have helped host nations implement human rights guarantees for soldiers, facilitate progress towards civilian control of the military, establish military legal codes and build programs to develop professional noncommissioned officers and chaplaincies. JCTP teams and the events they conduct provide a clear example of the benefits of a U.S. style military, as well as offer American solutions to the myriad of challenges faced by these emerging democracies. As the foundation of all (USEUCOM) bilateral programs, JCTP events pave the way for countries to participate in SAO and PFP activities".¹¹ Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania each have a USEUCOM J5-J MLT located within their respective capital city and assign workspaces either directly within their national military headquarters, or some nearby national military staff element. These four man teams are composed of a 0-6 team chief, 0-5 deputy, 0-4 operations officer and an enlisted (E-7/8) team NCO. Jointly manned, team members come from each of the four Services as well as the reserve component, both active reserve and the National Guard. The MLT works apart from the U.S. Embassy and generally speaking are embedded into the host nation's military interfacing primarily with the Ministry of Defense and General Staff. Tour lengths vary from six months to a year. Table (1) characterizes JCTP dynamics and shows USEUCOM office of primary responsibility. Traditional command relationships are retained with USEUCOM, but MLTs do support the U.S. Ambassador's country objectives, and based on

their presence in-country, answer to the Ambassador in order to ensure program integration into U.S. policy objectives.

Essentially the JCTP is all about opening doors--contacting, exposing, introducing and educating military leaders (junior to mid-grade officers and NCOs) in order to create a critical mass within their respective military which in theory will allow them to focus their policy, doctrine and training efforts. A significant factor in the JCTP is its Title 10, Section 168 parameters. Public Law prohibits the JCTP from using funds to provide training, services, equipment, or articles to their host nations. Nor can it pay for exercise participation. The basis for these Title 10 restrictions is the mandate to avoid duplication of any other U.S. programs, i.e., SAO, PFP, or DATT/DA0 activities.

State Partnership. The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a DOD initiated program that makes broad use of the reserve component, in particular the National Guard, for peacetime engagement activities. While the obvious advantages of force multiplier and relevance are secured by the SPP, its usefulness goes beyond filling the gap of what has been traditionally sourced by the ever-decreasing active duty structure and the provision of a meaningful post-Cold War mission for our Guard element. The SPP aligns the state of Maryland with Estonia; Michigan with Latvia; and Pennsylvania with Lithuania and provides a partnership to advance economic, political and military ties between one another. The military function is particularly successful, with 20 to 30 per cent of all JCTP activities being conducted by the SPP. Additionally, the 0-6 team chief of each MLT is a Guardsman. The living example of "citizen

soldier" is not lost on these countries as they endeavor to define their force structure and reserve capability.

Role of the Ambassador & the Country Team. The U.S. Ambassador at each of the three Baltic postings is, by definition, the authority for implementation of U.S. policy. As such, all peacetime engagement activities fall within the their auspices. The country teams of each U.S. Embassy include the broad range of economic, political and military expertise and form the basis for how policy is administered. The military slice of each country team consists of the Ambassador himself, his DATT, his SAO and USEUCOM's MLT chief. As the military-diplomatic representative of the Secretary of Defense; Service Secretaries and Chiefs; and the JCS, the DATT is the Ambassador's principal military staff advisor. It should be noted that the DATT is a 0-4/5, the SAO a 0-4 and the MLT chief a 0-6. Additionally, in each country the "uniform" presence is not very deep--a seven man, full-time U.S. military presence in each Baltic State (DATT, two; SAO, one; and MLT, four). In theory, each agency works together and is aware of each other's activities, in practice this isn't necessarily the case. Organizational priorities, differing masters, differing resource allocation sourcing, span of control, physical separation and in many cases, lack of understanding, poor information flow are but a few of the challenges to achieving an overarching peacetime engagement effort.

Regional Definition. Each of the Baltic States differ in demographics and social, political and military character, yet due to their recent history, geographic size and positioning they are less than unique with regards to security requirements and as a result their individual defense establishments are similar in need and desired capability. To that end, military structures

and sought force capabilities within each country have developed as rough mirror images of one another. Present in each defense establishment is a strong self-defensive posture coupled with a concern for regional capability. This self-defense stance is more than appropriate for their national strategies, population base, fiscal constraints and take full account of their physical locale to their once powerful yet still dangerous Eastern neighbor.

Estonia. Estonia's population numbers roughly 1.5 million and its total geographic area is slightly more than 45,000 square kilometers (or comparatively slightly smaller than New Hampshire and Vermont combined) and includes 3,794 km of coastline.¹² Its military structure includes a ground force, a naval/coast guard force, an air and air defense force, border guards and volunteer league (National Guard). Total military manpower is not more than 10.5 thousand and military expenditures in 1999 dollars is \$70 million (1.2% of GDP)¹³.

Latvia. Latvia is larger than its Northern neighbor, Estonia, both in population and size. Its population is roughly 2.3 million and its geographic area is 64,589 square kilometers (or comparatively slightly larger than West Virginia). Latvia's coastline is 531 km.¹⁴ Latvia's military structure includes a ground force, a navy, an air and air defense force, a security force, a border guard and a home guard (National Guard). Total military manpower is estimated at 16,883¹⁵ and military expenditures in 1999 dollars is \$60 million (0.9% of GDP).¹⁶

Lithuania. Lithuania, the most populated of the three Baltic counties, has over 3.5 million people. Its total geographic area is 65,200 square kilometers (comparatively slightly larger than West Virginia) with about 100 km of coastline.¹⁷ Military structure includes a ground

force, a navy, an air force, a border guard and a National Guard. Military manning numbers roughly 26 thousand¹⁸, and military expenditures in 1999 dollars is \$181 million (1.5% of GDP)¹⁹

Collective Arrangements. In recognition of their diminutive size and insufficient national resources and fiscal assets to providing individual defensive structures capable of singular or autonomous operations and in an effort to ensure that Western powers view their military progression in an attractive light, the three Baltic nations have established numerous trilateral arrangements. Aligning roughly to force structures, they include:

- **BALTBAT.** The Baltic Battalion is a combined infantry battalion fit for peace support operations. It consists of three rifle companies (one from each state) and a headquarters and support company and numbers at 750 men total. Latvia is the BALTBAT host country. BALTBAT trains together in each country and has deployed company and platoon sized units to various NATO-led peacekeeping missions. BALTBAT is supported by nine NATO and non-NATO countries including the United States²⁰.
- **BALTRON.** The Baltic Naval Squadron is a coordinated effort to implement various naval tasks between each of the three countries throughout the Baltic Sea. Focusing on mine clearing activities and search and rescue operations, its development and training align themselves to NATO standards and it is supported by 11 Western nations including the United States. Estonia hosts the BALTRON effort and there are a total of six BALTRON ships sourcing from the three Baltic countries²¹.

- **BALTNET.** The Baltic Air Surveillance Network is a regional airspace initiative designed to coordinate and display air surveillance data. Its main objective is to create a joint (combined) air surveillance system and to improve cooperation between each country's air surveillance and air defense authorities. Lithuania is assigned the host country responsibility. The United States is the lead Western nation in support of BALTNET efforts but there is a total 9 other nations involved with its continued development²².
- **BALTDEFCOL.** The Baltic Defence College is a trilateral effort to improve the professionalism and training of senior staff officers throughout the three country, armed forces. Geared towards improving training and education standards within the military it focuses on geographic and political conditions, territorial defense concepts and military technologies. Its graduates are capable of fulfilling billet assignments on international staffs, positions of chief of staff at military regions, and brigade-level or higher positions. Estonia functions as the host country and support efforts are divided among no fewer than 13 nations including the United States²³.
- **BALTSEA.** The Baltic Security Assistance program is a political forum established to increase the effectiveness of Western-based, security assistance. With the numerous Western-sourced assistant programs occurring within the region and each individual Baltic State, BALTSEA seeks to avoid duplication and identifies fields of endeavor where additional assistance may be warranted²⁴. No less 14 nations are actively involved in some

sort of security assistance within the Baltic States, thus this "clearinghouse" effort enhances the gains received by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but more importantly ensures that supporting dollars (that provided by the engaging nations) are put to proper use.

These five trilateral security arrangements serve to advance the individual and regional capabilities of each Baltic State. In the case of USEUCOM engagement strategies they provide the overarching definition to regional stability. By providing a bridge for the engagement foundation formed within each of the individual Baltic countries the five BALT-arrangements provide the CINC with an avenue for a broader regional approach. Regional approaches do not usurp bilateral efforts, nor are bilateral efforts of greater import than regional or trilateral approaches. Both are required to ensure a complete, well-fashioned theater engagement strategy.

Componency-Based Engagement. As previously mentioned, USEUCOM engagement strategies span the spectrum of military and other activities. Within the military arena USEUCOM makes use of each of the four armed services, USSOCOM and National Guard assets as well as the non-uniformed, DOD agencies and U. S. Coast Guard. This Joint approach remains relevant and will continue to pay dividends when the nature or functionality of the engagement activity is such that only a unique provider can accomplish the mission. In all cases the best provider is one that is first, well suited by status of functionality, and second, readily available by virtue of resourcing and standing mission commitment. That said, based on the character of the Baltic States (their force structures, trilateral arrangements, desired capabilities, defensive concepts, available resources and past performance in previous engagement activities) a component-based approach is both reasonable and economical. Reviewing each Baltic State's

military structure as well as the aforementioned regional defense arrangements the character of a small, multi-functional, yet uniquely maritime defense apparatus is apparent. As such, an U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps approach is merited. NAVEUR and MARFOREUR together are able to provide most, if not all, uniformed-type, mil-to-mil engagement activity within the Baltic States. By doing so we enable a much keener focus on what is needed, as well as define how and when it is accomplished. On the low end of the engagement spectrum these two components, either jointly or singularly, could provide the lion's share of JCTP activity. On the high end, or operational level, NAVEUR and MARFOREUR could easily meld a broad spectrum of engagement activities into a JTF construct (i.e., the NEF, ARG and/or SPMAGTF slice) in order to advance the CINC's theater engagement strategies. Focused engagement that benefits the target country/region and that is provided by assets that are both multi-functional and capable, and most importantly, that can anticipate, thus plan for, their occurrence is made possible via the component-based approach. *What military conditions must be produced... What sequence of actions must occur... How should the resources be applied... What are the costs...*²⁵ NAVEUR and MARFOREUR working in concert with the USEUCOM staff, in-country MLTs and the embassy-based country teams can construct engagement activities that consider these requirements and in doing so provide the CINC with options and activities that will ensure success.

Additional Alternatives. Without question, the USEUCOM peacetime engagement tool kit, as illustrated in the above discussions, contains individual activities that have both utility and shortfall. By complementary use of each tool within this kit, utility can be maximized and shortfall reduced. The functional area oversight of these programs, as shown by Table (1), is

spread throughout the USEUCOM staff and most likely resides where it has proven most effective. Bridging CINC concerns with DOS objectives also does not appear that problematic--these relationships have long been in force and extend beyond the execution of peacetime engagement. Thus, it is not so much what is being done, nor where and how program parameters are distinguished. Rather it may be that the in-country approach towards execution of these engagement activities bears closer examination.

It's important to recognize that the status quo will continue to provide positive impact towards obtaining U.S. interests throughout the Baltic States and that each country will certainly continue to gratefully receive the fruits of these engagement activities. Thus, consideration for a change in in-country, clearinghouse administration of these activities should be viewed as an opportunity to derive greater, in terms of better quality in shorter time, benefit and reduced costs. Beyond the aforementioned component-based engagement approach, additional alternatives include: reorganization of in-country, military "team"; assignment policies; redefinition of JCTP charter and mission limitations

Revised "Military Team". At best, the three military agencies (DATT, SAO & MLT) working with peacetime engagement activities in each Baltic country are roughly aligned with one another daily affairs. While each has unlimited access to virtually all levels of the host country's military leadership, both civil and uniformed, only the MLT is singularly focused on mil-to-mil, peacetime engagement. Thus, the MLT chief is well positioned to exert substantial influence in the broader spectrum of engagement than just that which pertains to the JCTP. This enhanced influence is not confined to that directed towards the host military, but also

internally--towards SAO and DATT peacetime engagement undertakings. This is not to suggest that the MLT chief should assume the leadership role as the senior military officer in-country. The DATT, regardless of any grade imbalance, by virtue of his specialized training and primary responsibilities is correctly recognized as the senior, in-country military authority. To umbrella engagement activities, consideration should be given to enhancing the military capabilities within the U.S. Embassy. Specifically, a regional Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) should be established within one of the Baltic post (ideally in Vilnius, due to Lithuania's advanced military standing). An ODC would not only enhance the growing SAO responsibilities associated with the Baltic States, but also provide the necessary clearinghouse capability required to efficiently align regional peacetime engagement activities. ODC staffing would increase manning requirements, one or two ideally, but the associated gains far outweigh the increased costs. The ODC would not only umbrella peacetime engagement activities, but could also provide oversight authority over all JCTP and SAO activities, thus serve as the terminal, in-country linchpin for USEUCOM J-3/4/5 generated strategies. Finally, due the naval (maritime and ground, i.e., littoral) character of the Baltic States and the suggested NAVEUR/MARFOREUR component engagement option, ODC staffing should consist of a senior naval officer.

Assignment Policies. Successful engagement strategies require expertise. Expertise that is gained through previous study and, or work experience within the focus region, or country. DATT and SAO billet preparation while sufficient in terms of DOS/DOD expertise does not necessarily produce a regional expert on the way in. Nor does the JCTP's selection and training process provide regional expertise. All are quality people who work hard in order to achieve

mission success, but few are experts in the FAO sense. Adding to this shortfall of expertise is the tour duration dilemma. While DATT and SAO tour lengths are generally two years in duration, the JCTP's MLT membership are assigned on a six month or one year basis. All too often as these non-regional experts achieve a "working expertise" they are rotated home and the cycle repeats itself. MLT composition may also bear examination. The SPP Guardsman in each of the Baltic MLTs is the O-6 team chief. Rarely, if ever is this billet filled by a regional expert. The Joint environment coupled with the overseas setting and a foreign military focus requires seasoned military leadership. The SPP team chief could certainly fulfill these requirements, but too often this does not occur. Solutions may include: targeting more FAOs for JCTP duties; longer assignments--one year minimums for the MLT; changing the MLT SPP billet from team chief to the deputy, or operations officer; and finally, downgrading the MIT O-6 billet to O-5 and providing a O-6 naval officer to the ODC billet. Fortunately, the USEUCOM J-3/5, NAVEUR N-3/5 and MARFOREUR G-3/5 billets are 36 month based.

Redefinition of JCTP Charter. As cited earlier the JCTP may not provide training within its charter. Title 10 requirements forbid training due to comparable activities found within other programs. This training limitation made sense early on in the engagement effort, but as militaries mature and define their structure, doctrine and training capabilities, their need for information exchanges decrease and the need for exercising and validating recently acquired knowledge increases. Training provides that opportunity. The JCTP could easily expand its engagement activities to include training; in fact, the MLTs are well positioned to do so based on their composition and mil-to-mil orientation. If deemed impractical, in lieu of Title 10 alteration,

the presence of an ODC activity would serve to define training opportunities for the host militaries.

Country vs. Regional Approach. Clearly, it has been to our advantage, as well as the individual states themselves to view engagement within the Baltics from a regional perspective. And while the states may push for a reduced regional orientation in order to enjoy country-specific recognition as they grow at differing rates, we must continue to consider the strength offered by a regional approach. Nonetheless, failing to recognize differing growth patterns and country-specific strengths and limitations will result in misguided engagement strategies. As such, both regional and country-specific peacetime engagement strategies must be perused within the Baltic States. Regional oversight, as provided by a regional ODC, can serve as the yardstick for such definition. Balancing country-specific and regional engagement activities requires in-depth knowledge of the whole as well as the parts.

Conclusion. In conclusion, incorporation of any, if not all, of these alternatives would benefit USEUCOM's peacetime engagement within the Baltics. The foundation of USEUCOM's peacetime engagement strategies consists of four individual programs that must be seamlessly executed. As one program's effectiveness is lessened by the achievement of its goals another activity must continue the effort. Undeniably, our current success will continue without these changes, but as peacetime engagement grows more expensive and the security environment continues to change within this historically volatile region our Shaping efforts must be both timely and accurate. Component-based engagement, in this case use of the Navy and the Marine Corps, makes sense. It would provide target countries with focused and well-placed advances

while at the same time provide the CINC with the unity of effort as well as the economy of resources while executing engagement activities and advancing U.S. security within the region. The Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are not only of great strategic import geographically, but economically, politically and militarily they offer to Western Europe and the United States the potential for great stabilization and regional access. As their governments and militaries continue their responsible growth and as their economies grow stronger and more diverse, our Baltics peacetime engagement activities will ensure the emergence of strong allies.

¹ The White House, A National Security Strategy for the Next Century, May 1997.

² Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, Speech on Peacetime Engagement, Marshall Center, Germany, 1 December 1999.

³ The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, December 1999.

⁴ Chief, Joint Chief of Staff, National Security Strategy. 1999.

⁵ U. S. European Command, Strategy of Readiness and Engagement, April, 1998, p.2.

⁶ Strategy Overview, USEUCOM ECJ5-J Briefing, May 1998.

⁷ American Embassy-Vilnius, Security Assistance Office Fact Sheet, May, 1998, p.1.

⁸ Overview George C. Marshall Center, [Online] Available <http://www.marshallcenter.org/overview.htm>, April 18, 2000.

⁹ Partnership for Peace, [Online] Available <http://www.eucom.mil/programs/pfp/index.htm>, April 21, 2000.

¹⁰ U.S. European Command, Baltics Strategy Summary, March 1999.

¹¹ J. A. Gagnon, Joint Contact Team Program, (ECJ5-J, 1997), p.1.

¹² CIA Factbook 1999 (Estonia).

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ CIA Factbook 1999 (Latvia).

¹⁵ This figure includes non-uniformed home guard forces; the actual active structure is much less.

¹⁶ Ibid. note # 14.

¹⁷ CIA Factbook 1999, (Lithuania).

¹⁸ This figure includes non-uniformed National Guard reserve forces; the actual active structure is less.

¹⁹ Ibid. note # 17.

²⁰ Baltic Defence Co-Operation, Fact Sheet No. 2, Joint Projects, 5 Feb 2000.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ "Four Questions", JMO Department, College of Naval Warfare, Naval War College.

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